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Abstract 
This article investigates a cultural segregation rule in the Sugarscape environment introduced by 
JM Epstein and R Aktell in “Growing Artificial Societies”. Methods for producing segregation, and 
quantitatively measuring the degree of segregation are discussed, and it is found that these 
simple rules are effective at producing segregation between 2 or many cultures. 
 
 
 
P2_1 Complex Systems 
 
Introduction 
Schelling’s segregation model [1] is a well studied model for the organisation of individuals from a 
random distribution, to large cultural groups. This article presents an extension on the Sugarscape 
model presented by JM Epstein and R Aktell [2] to model a similar form of cultural segregation with 
2, or many cultures. They begin by describing the Sugarscape as a 50x50 grid of patches. Each patch 
on the grid is assigned a maximum capacity for sugar. Patches begin following a single rule (G) to 
grow back sugar to this capacity. The Sugarscape is populated by agents who begin with a single rule 
(M) to move and eat the sugar. A “tick” is a single time-period on the Sugarscape. Each tick, all 
agents and patches carry out their rules in a random order and by adding additional simple 
behavioural rules, the Sugarscape becomes home to a colourful variety of emergent structure and 
behaviour. 
 
Model 
For this model, the Sugarscape presented by JM Epstein and R Aktell has been constructed in 
NetLogo. Agents typically obey movement rule M and patches follow grow back rule G. 
 
The next step is to describe the agents’ culture. A simple approach to this is to assign each agent a 
random integer between 1 and numCultures to represent their individual culture. This parameter 
can be altered to change the number of possible cultures. They are also given the ability to store a 
short list of agents they consider friends. Agents initially have no knowledge of the culture of other 
agents. Each tick, agents follow an additional rule, friendship rule F. For each agent in a patch 
adjacent to the active agent: 
 
1. Calculate the difference between my culture and the neighbours culture 
2. If this result is greater than tolerance, stop 
3. If the neighbour is not already there, add him to my list of friends 
4. If the length of my friends list is greater than maxFriends, remove 1 friend at random 
 
Agents create individual lists of culturally similar friends up to a length maxFriends. The effect of this 
is to slightly modify the existing movement rule M. Rather than identifying the richest patches, and 
moving to the closest one as they would normally, agents identify the richest patches, and move to 
the patch with the lowest mean distance to the members of their friends list. Although they 
prioritise gathering sugar over their friends, they show preference for patches closer to their friends. 
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This article focuses on applying this model on a “flat” landscape, where patches are all uniform (as 
opposed to the “hills” in the traditional Sugarscape) in the simple case of numCultures = 2 (only 2 
possible cultures, as with Schelling’s model) and tolerance = 0 (agents will only befriend culturally 
identical agents). maxFriends is varied, and it’s effect on the overall degree of segregation is 
measured. The method used to quantitatively define degree of segregation, S, at each time-step is to 
take each agent in turn, find the fraction of neighbours with the same culture as the agent and 
average across the whole population. 
 
where a is a member of A, the set of all agents, Ca is the number of adjacent agents with the same 
culture as the agent, Na is the total number of neighbouring agents and n is the total number of 
agents. 
Plot (1) shows how the degree of segregation 
achieved varies with maxFriends. Data points 
are taken by using the mean segregation 
between 1000 and 2000 ticks. Errors are 
taken as the variance of segregation during 
this time period. 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen in (1) by maxFriends = 5, we have almost reached saturation with a degree of 
segregation of 0.91±0.0001, increasing slightly to 0.95±0.00002 with a list length of 80. The character 
of this graph is interesting, and illustrates a phase transition from generally unorganised agents, to 
an organised structure around maxFriends values of 2 and 3, where the increase in segregation 
achieved increases most rapidly. 
 
This model transfers equally well to a non-uniform landscape producing several different modes of 
segregation. Additionally, by increasing numCultures, segregation between many cultures can be 
seen. The effect of increasing tolerance is for much more mixing to occur, although agents still tend 
to cluster with other culturally identical agents to some degree. 
 
Discussion 
The result of this model is interesting, as with each agent only remembering 3 or 4 friends, a large 
degree of segregation can be seen with clusters of hundreds of agents. The length of the friends list 
acts as a binding force. Smaller lists produce a more dynamic population with more mixing between 
cultures. Clusters move, divide and join constantly, while longer lists produce a more static 
population distribution. 
 
Conclusion 
This method of segregation has been successful in creating a form of cultural segregation from the 
bottom up. From a short list of personal friends, agents cluster into large and often spatially distinct 
groups. This has potential to create some interesting effects on the Sugarscape. For example, we 
would expect a culture occupying rich sugar regions to have a comparative advantage over other 
cultures due to the low mixing. 
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